Plane crash at DCA

[red viking]

The blame needs to go all the way up the chain of command. 

[1032004]

5 hours ago, Tripnsweep said:

*January 20: Trump FIRES the FAA director
*January 21: Trump FREEZES all Air Traffic Controller hiring
*January 22: Trump DISBANDS the Aviation Safety Advisory Committee
*January 28: Trump sends a buyout/retirement ransom letter to existing FAA employees
*January 29: First American mid-air collision in 16 years, 67 fatalities.

Based on the audio, the air traffic controller did nothing wrong.  Seems like the blame is on the helicopter.

[headshuck]

[headshuck]

Many of the followup questions of the senator are related to not knowing who was piloting the helicopter?

[ionel]

Generally in aviation accidents their are minimum of chain of three mistakes/issues.  If eliminate one of the three can save the event.  The current ones I see from info available:

1) tower was understaffed, one controller was dealing with both the helicopter and the AA flight, it was still busy time of the day/night

2) American Airlines CJ (AA) was shooting the ILS to runway 01 after obtaining visual the tower had them circle to land on 33.  Not necessarily a mistake, happens all the time, but with Blackhawk (BH) traffic coming down the river east side route then why send AA up the river over the route head on with the BH.

3) BH was asked if had visual and confirmed had visual.  Again happens all the time its then his job to maintain visual separation.  However with ~300 mph closer rate and other traffic, lights etc down there at 200' how do we (the tower) know he has visual on the correct traffic target.

4) Appears BH may have been too high, should've been 200' might've been 400' 

 

Break the chain of errors.

(1) If two are working the problem instead of one maybe they see the conflict earlier, stop the BH or clear the AA straight in on 01 and hold ground departure and no accident.

(2) If AA is given clear to land 01 or says "unable 33" then there is no circle toward the BH route on east side an no accident.

(3) If BH is given immediate hold (instead of visual) and or instructed immediate decent to 200' then maybe not accident but AA is still circle to 33 and descend and might be going over top of BH at 400 so only 200' clearance - not good.

(4) If BH at proper altitude maybe no accident but still a near miss given the circle to land visual 33.

 

Given the closer rate numbers 1 and 2 above seem most critical to me at this point but the black boxes will give us much better info.  

[billyhoyle]

I'm excited to see all the immunology experts who became AI experts now become aviation experts. 

[Tripnsweep]

3 hours ago, billyhoyle said:

I'm excited to see all the immunology experts who became AI experts now become aviation experts. 

Also military experts who believe Trump has a plan to deal with cartels. 

[1032004]

Army releases name of third helicopter pilot.  A female, but based on her accomplishments not unqualified.  Of course many on social media jumping on the fact that she might have been a lesbian, as if that matters

https://www.army.mil/article/282772

[Offthemat]

 

[Interviewed_at_Weehawken]

On 2/2/2025 at 12:17 AM, Tripnsweep said:

Also military experts who believe Trump has a plan to deal with cartels. 

Don't you have multiple posts acting like a military expert who knows what will not work vs cartels? 

[Tripnsweep]

3 hours ago, Interviewed_at_Weehawken said:

Don't you have multiple posts acting like a military expert who knows what will not work vs cartels? 

Except I'm not. I'm just looking at it common sense wise. 

[Bigbrog]

2 minutes ago, Tripnsweep said:

Except I'm not. I'm just looking at it common sense wise. 

  

[wrestlingguy]

On 1/30/2025 at 9:27 PM, Tripnsweep said:

Trump and Vance started it. That was literally the first thing out of their mouth. 

Are you 2?

[mspart]

What if the NTSB finds that all of the ATC folks were qualified, but that the qualifications are lacking and want them more stringent.  Would that be a logical thing to do to reduce the possibility of future accidents?

mspart

[ionel]

8 minutes ago, mspart said:

What if the NTSB finds that all of the ATC folks were qualified, but that the qualifications are lacking and want them more stringent.  Would that be a logical thing to do to reduce the possibility of future accidents?

mspart

Don't think the issue is so much the qualifications but the staffing numbers.  Been reported/suggested DCA was at about 67% of the expected staffing level. Also only one working both traffic when normally two thru the busy hours.  Director of training in Oklahoma suggested they were getting plenty of applicants but only putting out ~ 70 to 80% of the numbers in the past due to ratios.  

Edited February 4 by ionel

[mspart]

That's my point.  If plenty of applicants that can't be hired due to some kind of quota  system like DEI, then that needs to change.   The issue at Reagan is numbers for sure.   They were understaffed.   But what if the qualifcations are lower now than they were 10, 20, or 30 years ago and NTSB calls that out.   Would that be a valid thing to consider based on a thorough investigation?

mspart

[Offthemat]

7 minutes ago, mspart said:

That's my point.  If plenty of applicants that can't be hired due to some kind of quota  system like DEI, then that needs to change.   The issue at Reagan is numbers for sure.   They were understaffed.   But what if the qualifcations are lower now than they were 10, 20, or 30 years ago and NTSB calls that out.   Would that be a valid thing to consider based on a thorough investigation?

mspart

Definitely. 

[fishbane]

40 minutes ago, ionel said:

Don't think the issue is so much the qualifications but the staffing numbers.  Been reported/suggested DCA was at about 67% of the expected staffing level. Also only one working both traffic when normally two thru the busy hours.  Director of training in Oklahoma suggested they were getting plenty of applicants but only putting out ~ 70 to 80% of the numbers in the past due to ratios.  

I'm sure there will be staffing recommendations by the NTSB, but I don't think it will be the most significant cause.  At the time of the accident reports are that one controller was manning to stations/sectors.  This was not normal for the time, and usually would have occurred an hour later than it did.  So less than an hour later the staffing would have normal and it seems like the same thing could have happened.

[ionel]

18 minutes ago, fishbane said:

I'm sure there will be staffing recommendations by the NTSB, but I don't think it will be the most significant cause.  At the time of the accident reports are that one controller was manning to stations/sectors.  This was not normal for the time, and usually would have occurred an hour later than it did.  So less than an hour later the staffing would have normal and it seems like the same thing could have happened.

They would not have been as busy an hour later, hence why they back off to one controller later.   That flight would've already landed.  

[fishbane]

13 minutes ago, ionel said:

They would not have been as busy an hour later, hence why they back off to one controller later.   That flight would've already landed.  

I don't think staffing will be the most significant cause/recommendation in the final report.  It is unclear to be if we are comparing air traffic at the time of the incident to an hour later or less than an hour later.  The crash happened at 8:47 PM and the report was that there was a single ATC was doing a job usually handled by two.  One ATC often handles these two jobs later in the day, but on this particular day it happened an hour earlier than normal.  To me that means that could mean that normally they have two ATCs until 9PM, but on this particular day they went down to 1 an hour earlier at 8PM.  So we might be comparing traffic at 8:47 to 9:00 with could be similar.

In any event I think it is likely that at some point under normal staffing a single ATC would be directing a similar number of planes and helicopters and have to manage a conflict like this.  NASA's aviation safety reporting system database has 23 near misses between helicopters and planes at DCA since 1988 and 10 in the past 12 years.  Did they all occur when a single controller was covering two sectors?

[ionel]

5 minutes ago, fishbane said:

I don't think staffing will be the most significant cause/recommendation in the final report.  It is unclear to be if we are comparing air traffic at the time of the incident to an hour later or less than an hour later.  The crash happened at 8:47 PM and the report was that there was a single ATC was doing a job usually handled by two.  One ATC often handles these two jobs later in the day, but on this particular day it happened an hour earlier than normal.  To me that means that could mean that normally they have two ATCs until 9PM, but on this particular day they went down to 1 an hour earlier at 8PM.  So we might be comparing traffic at 8:47 to 9:00 with could be similar.

In any event I think it is likely that at some point under normal staffing a single ATC would be directing a similar number of planes and helicopters and have to manage a conflict like this.  NASA's aviation safety reporting system database has 23 near misses between helicopters and planes at DCA since 1988 and 10 in the past 12 years.  Did they all occur when a single controller was covering two sectors?

I think they said its usually till 9:30 but one controller left early.  Have you every flown into a busy airport like DCA?  When you've got a 300 kts closure rate you don't want to be waiting for the controller to get back to you.  

[fishbane]

1 minute ago, ionel said:

I think they said its usually till 9:30 but one controller left early.  Have you every flown into a busy airport like DCA?  When you've got a 300 kts closure rate you don't want to be waiting for the controller to get back to you.  

I've never flown an aircraft anywhere much less DCA.  I don't think either aircraft was waiting for ATC to get back to them in this situation.

If near misses occur at times when there are two controllers doing this job or with only one controller but after 9:30 (or whenever it normally reduces to 1) then either they are must be understaffed even under normal operations or other factors are likely equally significant.  

[ionel]

1 minute ago, fishbane said:

I've never flown an aircraft anywhere much less DCA.  I don't think either aircraft was waiting for ATC to get back to them in this situation.

If near misses occur at times when there are two controllers doing this job or with only one controller but after 9:30 (or whenever it normally reduces to 1) then either they are must be understaffed even under normal operations or other factors are likely equally significant.  

It appeared the Blackhawk hit the CRJ within a few seconds of being instructed to pass behind.  And couldve instructed "left turn pass behind" then more clear it wasn't the other aircraft.  300mph closure rate is 12 seconds to go a mile correct?

[fishbane]

14 hours ago, ionel said:

It appeared the Blackhawk hit the CRJ within a few seconds of being instructed to pass behind.  And couldve instructed "left turn pass behind" then more clear it wasn't the other aircraft.  300mph closure rate is 12 seconds to go a mile correct?

An object traveling at constant velocity of 300mi/hr will travel about one mile in 12s.

A few seconds before the collision is not enough time.  The Blackhawk pilots might not have even had time to read the instruction back.  

There was a near miss the day before earlier around 8PM EST between a helicopter and a plane landing on another runway.  Was staffing not normal then too?  If not the extra controller was not what broke the chain of errors.  It was a RA from the planes TCAS which resulted in a go round.

I'm sure there will be discussion on staffing as a contributing factor in the final report, but a helicopter and a plane could come into conflict at a time when 1 controller was handling both.  

[fishbane]

On 2/1/2025 at 7:58 PM, ionel said:

2) American Airlines CJ (AA) was shooting the ILS to runway 01 after obtaining visual the tower had them circle to land on 33.  Not necessarily a mistake, happens all the time, but with Blackhawk (BH) traffic coming down the river east side route then why send AA up the river over the route head on with the BH.

Break the chain of errors.

(2) If AA is given clear to land 01 or says "unable 33" then there is no circle toward the BH route on east side an no accident.

Given the closer rate numbers 1 and 2 above seem most critical to me at this point but the black boxes will give us much better info.  

I think the use of runway 33 in conjunction with the helicopter traffic is more significant than 1.  There will likely be significant recommendations related to this.  Maybe runway 33 will be closed.  Maybe helicopter traffic rerouted.  Maybe training ATC to handle these conflicts differently in the future including not relying on the helicopter to maintain visual separation.

What basis would the pilots of the plane have to reject the request and say "unable 33?" The request was 2 minutes before the collision.  Using the earlier math the helicopter would have been 10 mi away from the plane and not directly on front of it either.  ATC had not yet advised the helicopter to maintain visual separation.  Its not like the pilots have radar in the cockpit showing the position of the helicopter.  The only way for them to know it was there was if they spotted it 10mi away looking outside.

To me the only opportunity the airplane pilots had to break the sequence leading up to the accident would have been to take action when the received the TCAS TA which happened 18s before the crash, but even that seems unlikely.