Let me take a crack at this. All banks work pretty much the same way. They take either maturity risk (i.e. borrow short-term and lend long-term), credit risk, or both. This can be done very riskily or not. To mitigate some of that risk some banks also pursue fee based businesses.
But an old school, traditional bank activity is to take deposits (borrow short-term) and pay little or no interest on those deposits. They then make longer-term loans to businesses and individuals (mortgages, for example). Long-term rates tend to be higher than short-term rates, so they make money on the spread. But there is a basic problem all banks need to manage. The deposits can leave at any time, but they do not have the right to call the loans. If all depositors want all of their money back at the same time, every single bank in the world will become insolvent. They can make the most prudent, intelligent loans ever that are all money good and it still will not matter. They have to wait to get their money back, but depositors do not.
One way to manage this risk is to have diversified sources of depositors. Open branches everywhere, offer toasters and pens, advertise locally and nationally, etc. That way all depositors are less likely to act as a single group.
Silvergate and Signature were two large bankers for the crypto industry. Their deposits were tightly tied to the health of crypto as many of their customers were crypto exchanges who needed access to the traditional financial system. When crypto exchanges faced massive withdrawals, they took their deposits en masse. It no longer mattered what their loans looked like.
Ditto for Silicon Valley Bank, except substitute private equity funded start ups for crypto. With start up money drying up they turned from net depositors to net withdrawers. SVB also failed to manage their maturity risk appropriately so that when the mark-to-market value of their loans (i.e. long dated treasuries and agency mortgage bonds) went down their capital ratio shrunk. Private equity investors noticed and told all their clients to pull their deposits. When the heard moves, there is not much that can be done (especially if you have mis-managed this risk).
Ultimately, it was the combination of losing non-diversified deposits and higher interest rates (which decreased the current value of assets, but not necessarily the future value) that got all three. Unless other banks have made similar mistakes, then they have not much to worry about, except that all banks survive on depositor confidence - just ask George Bailey.